Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles

# Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles > OpenAlex Metadata Hub · https://openalex.org/W2046642512 ## Bibliographic - **DOI:** 10.2307/2297526 - **Year:** 1988 - **Citations:** 1618 - **Open Access:** Yes (green) - **License:** — - **Source:** https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/292676/files/uwmad-0028.PDF ## Authors - Kenneth Rogoff - Anne Sibert ## Abstract There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defence. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favourable or extremely unfavourable. An exogeneous increase in the incumbent party's popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle. ## Keywords Economics, Library science, Economic history, History, Classics, Computer science ## Concepts - Economics - Library science - Economic history - History - Classics - Computer science --- *Metadata only — full text not imported unless Open Access license permits.*

Bài “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles” được TradingBase chuyển thành Knowledge Product cho trader — không phải trang đọc abstract OpenAlex. Tóm lược học thuật (đã diễn giải): There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defence. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favourable or extremely unfavourable. An exogeneous increase in the incumbent party's popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle. Phần Trading Insights bên dưới nối nghiên cứu với Forex, vàng, USD, lãi suất và risk regime — để bạn đưa vào journal và playbook. Metadata DOI/OA chỉ là rail tham chiếu; nội dung chính là summary, takeaways và ứng dụng thị trường do Content Factory sinh.