Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?
In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries. In light of this experience, how, if at all, should central bankers respond to asset price volatility? We have addressed this issue in…
# Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?
> OpenAlex Metadata Hub · https://openalex.org/W2095678191
## Bibliographic
- **DOI:** 10.1257/aer.91.2.253
- **Year:** 2001
- **Citations:** 1179
- **Open Access:** No (closed)
- **License:** —
- **Source:** https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.253
## Authors
- Ben Bernanke
- Mark Gertler
## Abstract
In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries. In light of this experience, how, if at all, should central bankers respond to asset price volatility? We have addressed this issue in previous work (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). The context of our earlier study was the relatively new, but increasingly popular, monetary-policy framework known as inflation-targeting (see e.g., Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, 1997). In an inflation-targeting framework, publicly announced medium-term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy, while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run. The inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices: Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank’s forecast of inflation. To a first approximation, once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for, there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations. In use now for about a decade, inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice. However, so far this approach has not often been stress-tested by large swings in asset prices. Our earlier research employed simulations of a small, calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation-targeting policy (defined as one in which the central bank’s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation) might fare in the face of a boom-and-bust cycle in asset prices. We found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule (in our simulations, one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2.0) substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses, as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices. Intuitively, inflation-targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices, while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand. Conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation, we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central-bank policy to the level of asset prices. In our view, there are good reasons, outside of our formal model, to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices, including the fact that (as history has shown) the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable. Hence, we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast. In the spirit of recent work on robust control, the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst-case † Discussants: Robert Shiller, Yale University; Glenn Rudebusch, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University.
## Keywords
Economics, Monetary policy, Inflation targeting, Asset (computer security), Monetary economics, Inflation (cosmology), Interest rate, Quantitative easing, Macroeconomics, Central bank
## Concepts
- Economics
- Monetary policy
- Inflation targeting
- Asset (computer security)
- Monetary economics
- Inflation (cosmology)
- Interest rate
- Quantitative easing
- Macroeconomics
- Central bank
- Computer science
- Computer security
- Theoretical physics
- Physics
---
*Metadata only — full text not imported unless Open Access license permits.*
Bài “Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?” được TradingBase chuyển thành Knowledge Product cho trader — không phải trang đọc abstract OpenAlex.
Tóm lược học thuật (đã diễn giải): In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries. In light of this experience, how, if at all, should central bankers respond to asset price volatility? We have addressed this issue in previous work (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). The context of our earlier study was the relatively new, but increasingly popular, monetary-policy framework known as inflation-targeting (see e.g., Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, 1997). In an inflation-targeting framework, publicly announced medium-term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy, while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run. The inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices: Changes in asset prices shou…
Phần Trading Insights bên dưới nối nghiên cứu với Forex, vàng, USD, lãi suất và risk regime — để bạn đưa vào journal và playbook.
Metadata DOI/OA chỉ là rail tham chiếu; nội dung chính là summary, takeaways và ứng dụng thị trường do Content Factory sinh.
1. In recent decades, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries.
2. In light of this experience, how, if at all, should central bankers respond to asset price volatility?
3. We have addressed this issue in previous work (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999).
4. The context of our earlier study was the relatively new, but increasingly popular, monetary-policy framework known as inflation-targeting (see e.g., Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, 1997).
5. In an inflation-targeting framework, publicly announced medium-term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy, while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run.
6. The inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices: Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank’s forecast of inflation.
Trader nên nối luận điểm policy/lãi suất trong tài liệu với bias trung hạn của USD và các cặp major — đặc biệt quanh FOMC / dữ liệu CPI.
Với XAUUSD: kỳ vọng cắt lãi / USD yếu thường hỗ trợ vàng; hawkish surprise thường gây áp lực giảm — dùng khung này để đọc reaction sau tin, không đoán trước.
Các kỹ thuật ML/quantitative trong tài liệu hữu ích để tư duy feature & regime, nhưng không thay risk rules: luôn gắn signal với position sizing và news filter.
Góc Forex: đối chiếu kết luận bài với hành giá gần nhất và lịch tin impact cao trước khi vào lệnh.
Góc Gold (XAUUSD): đối chiếu kết luận bài với hành giá gần nhất và lịch tin impact cao trước khi vào lệnh.
Trading: rút 1 bias hoặc 1 setup hypothesis từ Key Takeaways, test trên demo/journal trước khi live.
Risk: chuyển insight thành rule (max risk/trade, pause quanh tin, correlation USD–vàng) và gắn vào playbook.